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We consider a Hotelling model of price competition where firms may acquire 
costly information regarding the preferences (i.e. “location”) of customers. By 
purchasing additional information, a firm has a finer partition regarding 
customer preferences, and its pricing decisions must be measurable with respect 
to this partition. If information acquisition decisions are common knowledge at 
the point where firms compete via prices, we show that a pure strategy subgame 
perfect equilibrium exists, and that there is “excess information acquisition” from 
the point of view of the firms.  If information acquisition decisions are private 
information, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. We compute a mixed 
strategy equilibrium for a range of parameter values. 
 
1 Introduction 
Usually, any type of price discrimination requires customer-specific information1
Consider a model of competition between firms who are able to charge different prices if 
they can distinguish customer characteristics. Most research on discriminatory pricing 
assumes that the information regarding consumers is exogenously given. The price 
discrimination literature concentrates on monopolistic price discrimination (Pigou, 1920; 
. In 
general, it is costly to acquire information regarding customers. Recent developments in 
information technology allow firms to acquire more information on their customers, which 
may be used to practise price discrimination. Loyalty cards issued by supermarkets and 
customer data collected by specialist companies are just two examples of information 
acquisition. 
                                               
1   The exceptions for this claim are the case in which the firm practices price discrimination through setting a 
uniform price when the cost of supply is different and when firm uses a non-linear pricing strategy. 
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Robinson, 1933; Schmalensee, 1981; Varian, 1985; Varian, 1989; and Hamilton & Slutsky, 
2004). Such discrimination always leads to higher profits for the monopolist, since she solves 
her profit maximisation problem with fewer constraints. 
Some of the more recent work on competitive price discrimination concentrates on 
efficiency from society’s point of view, the firm’s profit, and the number of the firms in a free 
entry and exit case2
Our main result is that the equilibrium outcome is partial information acquisition, even if 
information costs are arbitrarily small. Quite naturally, a firm has no incentive to acquire 
information on customers who are firmly in its rival’s turf, i.e. those that it will never serve in 
equilibrium. But more interestingly, we find that a firm has an incentive not to fully acquire 
information on customers it competes for with the other firm. This allows it to commit to 
 (Borenstein, 1985; Corts, 1998; Armstrong & Vickers, 2001; and Bhaskar 
& To, 2004), but still the information regarding consumers is exogenously given.  
Bhaskar & To (2004) prove that without free entry, perfect price discrimination is socially 
optimal, but in free entry case, the number of firms is always excessive. 
Liu & Serfes (2004, 2005) study the relation between of the exogenously given quality of 
firm information and market outcomes in oligopoly. They show that when the information 
quality is low, unilateral commitments not to price discriminate arise in equilibrium.  
However, once information quality is sufficiently high, firms discriminate. Equilibrium 
profits are lower, the game effectively becoming a prisoners’ dilemma.  
Shaffer & Zhang (2002) investigate one-to-one promotions. They assume that customers 
can be contacted individually, and firms know something about each customer’s preferences. 
They find that one-to-one promotions always lead to an increase in price competition and 
average prices will decrease. However, they show that if one of the firms has a cost advantage 
or higher quality product, the increase in its market share may outweigh the effect of lower 
prices..  
Corts (1998) investigates price discrimination by imperfectly competitive firms. He 
shows that the intensified competition, leading to lower prices, may make firms worse off and 
as a result firms may wish to avoid the discriminatory outcome. Unilateral commitments not 
to price discriminate may raise firm profits by softening price competition. 
In this paper, we endogenize the information firms acquire by introducing an information 
acquisition technology. We assume that firms decide on how many units of information to 
acquire. Then each firm can charge different prices for different customers based on the 
information she acquired. We study a Hotelling type model where two firms are located at the 
ends of the unit interval. Each unit of information gives a firm a finer partition over the set of 
customers. Specifically, a firm’s information consists of a partition of the unit interval, and an 
extra unit of information allows the firm to split one of the subintervals into two equal-sized 
segments. In our benchmark model, the information acquisition decisions of firms are 
common knowledge at the point where firms compete via prices. 
                                               
2  For a more detailed survey on recent literature in price discrimination see Armstrong (2006). 
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higher prices, and thereby softens price competition. Finally, as in the existing literature, we 
find that there is “excess information acquisition” from the point of view of the firms, in the 
sense that profits are lower as compared to the no information case.  
Information acquisition results in tougher competition, and lower prices. After 
information acquisition stage when firms compete via prices, if two firms share the market 
over a given set of customers, a decrease in the price of one firm over this interval decreases 
the marginal revenue of the other firm by decreasing its market share on this interval. As a 
result this reinforces the other firm to decrease its price over that interval. We can interpret 
this result in context of strategic complementarity as defined by Bulow et al (1985). In our 
benchmark model, pricing decisions are strategic complements. Since a firm’s optimal price is 
an increasing function of her opponent’s price. The literature on strategic complementarity 
finds similar results to our results when firms’ actions are strategically complements. 
Fudenberg & Tirole (1984) show that in a two stage entry game of investment, the incumbent 
might decide to underinvest in order to deter entry. d’Aspremont et al (1979) consider a 
Hotelling framework, with quadratic transportation costs, when firms should choose their 
location. They show that in the equilibrium in order to avoid tougher competition, firms locate 
themselves at the two extremes (maximum differentiation). Similarly, in our model, a firm 
acquires less information in order to commit to pricing high, thereby increases the price of her 
rival.  
We also analyse a game where a firm does not know its rival’s information acquisition 
decision at the point that they compete in prices. We show, quite generally that there is no 
pure strategy equilibrium in this game. We compute a mixed strategy equilibrium for a 
specific example.  
Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 analyzes the extensive form game; where 
each firm observes her rival’s information partition so that the information acquisition 
decisions are common knowledge. Section 4 studies the game where information acquisition 
decisions are private. Section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
2 The Model 
The model is based on a simple linear city (Hotelling model) where two firms (A and B) 
compete to sell their product to customers located between them. Both firms have identical 
marginal costs, normalized to zero. The distance between two firms is normalized to one; firm 
A is located at 0 and firm B at 1. The customers are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1] 
and the total mass of them is normalized to one. Each customer, depending on her location 
and the prices charged by firms, decides to buy one unit from any of the firms or does not buy 
at all. The utility of buying for each customer has a linear representation 𝑈𝑈 = 𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃 − 𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇 
where P stands for price, and TC represents the transportation cost to buy from each firm that 
is a linear function of distance and t is the transport cost per unit distance. Assume that V is 
sufficiently high to guarantee that all the market will be served. Then the utility of the 
customer who is located at 𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,1] is 
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𝑈𝑈(𝑥𝑥) = � 𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑡𝑡𝑥𝑥     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐴𝐴
𝑉𝑉 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) − 𝑡𝑡(1 − 𝑥𝑥)     𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑒 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑠𝑠 𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝐵𝐵   .                    (1) 
A unit of information enables the firm to split an interval segment of her already 
recognized customers to two equal-sized sub-segments. The information about the customers, 
below and above the mid-point of [0,1] interval, is revealed to the firm if it pays a cost 𝜏𝜏(0). 
Every unit of more information enables the firm to split an already recognized interval, [a , b] 
to two equal-sized sub-intervals. The cost to the firm is 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) where 𝑏𝑏 − 𝑎𝑎 = �12�𝑘𝑘(where 
𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℵ ∪ {0}). The information cost function can be represented by the infinite sequence 
〈 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) 〉0∞ . It seems reasonable to assume that 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) is decreasing in k. Intuitively the smaller 
the interval, the fewer consumers on whom information is needed. Then a reasonable 
assumption for the information cost function is that 𝜏𝜏 is a decreasing function.  
We assume a decreasing information cost function when the cost of acquiring information 
on an interval [a,b] is: 
𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘  ,               where              b − 𝑎𝑎 = �12�𝑘𝑘 ,                    (2) 
and 𝜏𝜏0 is a constant. Note that because of our information acquisition technology k is always 
an integer.  
By buying every extra unit of information, a firm is acquiring more specific information 
with less information content in terms of the mass of customers.  
The general results of the paper, i.e. the excessive information acquisition, the trade-off 
between information acquisition and tougher competition, and the characteristics of 
equilibrium are consistent for a wide range of information cost functions. In appendix B, we 
extend our results to two other functional forms.  
We analyse two alternative extensive form games. In the first game, each firm observes 
its rival’s information acquisition decision. That is, the information partitions become 
common knowledge before firms choose prices.  
The first game is defined as follows: 
• Stage 1: Information acquisition: Each firm (𝑖𝑖 ∈ {𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵}) chooses a partition 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  of [0,1]  
from a set of possible information partitions Ω 
• Observation: Each firm observes the partition choice made by the other firm, e.g. firm A 
observes IB. Note that firm f’s information partition remains  𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  .  
• Stage 2: Price decision: Each firm chooses 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 : [0,1] → ℜ+ ∪ {0} which is measurable 
with respect to If . Once prices have been chosen, customers decide whether to buy from 
firm A or firm B or not to buy at all.  
The vector of prices chosen by each firm in stage 2 is segment specific. In fact a firm’s 
ability to price discriminate depends on the information partition that she acquires in stage 1. 
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Acquiring information enables the firm to set different prices for different segments of 
partition. 
In the second game firms do not observe their rival’s information partition. It means that 
the firms simultaneously choose a partition and a vector of prices measurable with their 
chosen partition. In order to make it simpler, the two games are called the two-stage game and 
the simultaneous move game respectively. 
Following we formally define the information acquisition technology. Intuitively, in this 
setting when a firm decides to acquire some information about customers, it is done by 
assuming binary characteristics for customers. Revealing any characteristics divides known 
segments customers to two sub-segments. We assume that these two sub-segments have equal 
lengths. 
Definition: The information acquisition decision for player f is the choice of 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  from the 
set of feasible partitions Ω on [0,1]. Ω is defined using our specific information 
acquisition technology: 
Suppose I is an arbitrary partition of [0,1] of the form [0,a1), [a1,a2), …, [an-1,1] if and 
only if:3
A firm’s action in stage 1 is the choice of an information partition from the set of possible 
information partitions. This choice can be represented by a sequence of {Yes, No} choices on 
a decision tree (figure 1). The firm begins with no information so that any customer belongs 
to the interval [0,1]. If the firm acquires one unit of information, the unit interval is partitioned 
into the sets [0,0.5] and (0.5,1]. That is, for any customer with location x, the firm knows 
whether x belongs to [0,0.5] or (0.5,1], but has no further information. If the firm chooses No 
at this initial node, there are no further choices to be made. However, if the firm chooses Yes, 
then it has two further decisions to make. She must decide whether to partition [0,0.5] into the 
subintervals [0,0.25] and (0.25,0,5]. Similarly, she must also decide whether to partition 
(0.5,1] into (0.5,0.75] and (0.75,1]. Once again, if she says No at any decision node, then there 
are no further decisions to be made along that node, whereas if she says Yes, then it needs to 
make two further choices. The cost associated with each Yes answer is 
  
𝑠𝑠0 = [𝑎𝑎0 ,𝑎𝑎1]          &          𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = [𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 ,𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖]          𝑖𝑖 ∈ {2 , 3 ,⋯  , 𝑛𝑛} 
∀ 𝑖𝑖 ∈ {1 , 2 ,⋯  ,𝑛𝑛 − 1}          ∃ 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0 , 1 ,⋯  , 𝑛𝑛}          𝑙𝑙 ≠ 𝑘𝑘          ∴           𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙 + 𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘2  
𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘 ∩ 𝑠𝑠𝑙𝑙 = ∅          ∀ 𝑙𝑙, 𝑘𝑘 ∈ {0 , 1 ,⋯  , 𝑛𝑛}           𝑙𝑙 ≠ 𝑘𝑘                                  (3) 
�𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘
𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=1 = [0 , 1]. 
)(kτ  (see equation (2) 
and figure 1). A No answer has no cost.  
                                               
3   The set of equations in (3) are the technical definition of our information acquisition technology. Defining 
each element of the partition as a half-closed interval is without loss of generality, since customers have 
uniform distribution and each point is of measure zero. 
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Figure 1: The decision tree for each firm regarding the information acquisition  
Acquiring information enables a firm to price discriminate. The prices are segment-
specific. The price component of any strategy (𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖) is a non-negative step function measurable 
with respect to 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  : 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 : [0,1] → ℜ+ ∪ {0} 
𝑥𝑥 ,𝑏𝑏 ∈ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖      ⇒      𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑏𝑏).                    (4) 
Then a feasible strategy for player f  can be written as: 
𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖 = �𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  ,𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖� where 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖  is measurable with respect to 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖  . 
Figure 2 shows a possible choice of strategy for one of the players.  
 
                               
0 8
1  41  83  21    85  43   87   1 
Figure 2: A price function consistent with the information acquisition definition 
Firm f ‘s payoff can be written as: 
 
Pr
ic
e 
Yes              No 
 
 Yes              No 
Yes              No 
  [0,0.25]                 (0.25,0.5]                 (0.5,0.75]                 (0.75,1] 
  [0,0.5]                                                  (0.5,1] 
[0,1] k = 0 
k = 2 
k = 1 
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𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥).𝑑𝑑𝑥𝑥
𝑥𝑥∈𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖
− Γ          where          𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 = �𝑥𝑥�𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0 , 1]  , 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) > 𝑈𝑈−𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥)�, 
and Γ  is the total information cost for the firm, 𝑈𝑈𝑖𝑖(𝑥𝑥) represents the utility of customer 
located at x if she buys from firm f with the general form of (1), − f stands for the other firm, 
and Zf  represents the set of customers who buy from f.  
Lemma 1: Suppose si ∈ IA and sj ∈ IB , where 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 ∩ 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗 = ∅, Then either si is a subset of sj 
or sj is a subset of si. 
Proof: By acquiring any information unit a firm can divide one of her existing intervals 
into two equal-sized sub-intervals. Given si is an element of A’s information partition, three 
possible distinct cases may arise: i) si is an element of firm B’s information partition. ii) si is a 
strict subset of an element of firm B’s information partition. iii) si is the union of several 
elements from B’s information partition.4
 
The blue and red lines show the partitions for si and sj respectively (the information 
partitions chosen by firm A and firm B).  
Figure 3: Three possible segmentation scenarios 
 
Figure 3 shows these three possibilities where i) si and sj are equal (case 1), ii) si is a 
proper subset of sj (case 2), and iii) sj is a proper subset of si (case 3). 
3 The Two-Stage Game 
This game can be broken down into four different scenarios (Figure 4). The first scenario 
relates to the case when neither of the firms acquires information. The second scenario 
represents the case where both firms acquire information. The third and fourth scenarios 
represent the situation where only one of the firms decides to acquire information.  
                                               
4   It is expected that in each firm’s turf the preferred segmentation scenario of the firm contains smaller 
segments compared with her rival’s preferred segments, but all cases are solved.  
Firm A 
Firm B Case 3: 
Firm A 
Firm B Case 2: 
Firm A 
Firm B Case 1: 
 8 
  Firm B 
  NI I 
Fi
rm
 A
 NI 1st Scenario 4th Scenario 
I 3rd Scenario 2nd Scenario 
Note: 3rd and 4th scenarios are symmetric 
Figure 4: Four different scenarios for the two-stage game  
Scenario One: Neither firm acquires information 
The first scenario (the case of acquiring no information and therefore no price 
discrimination) is easily solvable. In the equilibrium both firms charge uniform prices 
(𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡), they share the market equally, and each firm’s profit is 𝑡𝑡2.   
Scenario Two: Both firms acquire information 
In this scenario each firm acquires at least one unit of information that splits the interval 
[0,1] into subintervals ([0,0.5] and (0.5,1]. Let us consider competition on an interval that is a 
subset of [0,0.5] (given the symmetry of  the problem, our results also extend to the case 
where the interval is a subset of (0,5,1]).  
Let  ?̂?𝑠 ⊆ [0, 0.5] and  ?̂?𝑠 ∈ 𝐼𝐼𝐴𝐴 , i.e. assume that ?̂?𝑠 is an element of firm A’s information 
partition. Consider first the case where ?̂?𝑠 is the union of several elements of B’s information 
partition, i.e. ?̂?𝑠 = ⋃ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 , for i =1,2,…n; This situation corresponds to case 3 in Figure 3. 
 Since firm A’s profits on the rest of the interval do not depend upon 𝑃𝑃?̂?𝑠  , she must   
choose 𝑃𝑃?̂?𝑠  aiming to maximize her profit on ?̂?𝑠. By lemma 1, firm B’s profits on the 
components of ?̂?𝑠 only depend upon her prices on this interval. Therefore, a necessary 
condition for the Nash equilibrium is that: 
a) A chooses 𝑃𝑃?̂?𝑠  to maximize her profits on ?̂?𝑠, 
b) B chooses 𝑃𝑃1,⋯ ,𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛  to maximize her profits on ?̂?𝑠. 
An analogous argument also applies in cases 1 and 2.   
From the utility function (1), the indifferent customer xi in each si = (ai-1, ai] is located at:  Case 1 ∶   𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1;                 (5) Case 2 ∶   𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑛𝑛;                   (6) Case 3 ∶   𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛.                  (7) 
In addition, these values for 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  must lie in within the interval, i.e. the following inequality 
should be satisfied for each 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖:  
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𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑛𝑛 ;  and                   (8) 
Where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  are respectively the lower and upper borders of the segment 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  and 0 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ≤ 0.5. 
In each segment 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , the customers who are located to the left of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  buy from firm A, and 
the customers to the right of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  buy from firm B. If 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  (calculated in (5) or (6) or (7)) is larger 
than the upper border (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖) all customers on 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  buy from firm A. In this situation to maximize 
her profit, firm A will set her price for 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  to make the customer on the right border indifferent. 
Similarly, if 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1, firm B is a constrained monopolist on 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  and will set her price to make 
the customer on the left border indifferent. 
Profits for the firms in each section of case 1 are: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  −  𝑎𝑎0� , and                    (9) 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 � 𝑎𝑎1 − 12 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  � .                    (10) 
In cases 2 and 3, as mentioned before since the profit for each firm over 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  (i =1,2,…,n) 
can be presented only as a function of the prices over ?̂?𝑠, the maximization problem is solvable 
for ?̂?𝑠 independently. In case 2, firms’ profits on ?̂?𝑠 are: 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  −  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1� ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑛𝑛 ;  and                   (11) 
 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 ∑ �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 12 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵−𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡  �𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 �∑ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑛𝑛2 − 𝑛𝑛  𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵−∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=12𝑡𝑡  � .                          (12) 
Similarly for case 3, the profits can be written as: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴��12 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 �𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 �𝑛𝑛2 + ∑ 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑛𝑛 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 −�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 � ; and             (13) 
𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 12 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 � ,           for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑛𝑛.                   (14) 
So for cases 2 and 3, there are n+1 maximization problems on each ?̂?𝑠 which should be 
solved simultaneously. 
Let IA and IB be two feasible information partitions for A and B respectively. Let I* be the 
join of IA and IB, i.e. the coarest partition of [0,1] that is finer than either IA or IB. Let s* be the 
element of I* which is of the form [a,0.5), i.e. s* is the element that  lies on the left and is 
closest to the midpoint.  
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Lemma 2: s* is the only element of I* which lies to the left of 0.5 such that both firms 
share the market. On every other element of I* which lies to the left of the midpoint, all 
customers buy from firm A.5
                                               
5  The solution for the interval [0,0.5] can be extended to interval (0.5,1] where the solution is the mirror image 
of the result on [0,0.5].  
 
Proof: See appendix A. 
So both firms sell positive quantities only in the most right hand segment of firm A’s turf 
and the most left hand segment of firm B’s turf.  
This lemma has the following important implication. A firm has no incentive to acquire 
information in its rival’s turf. For example if firm A acquires some information on interval 
(0.5,1]; then firm B can choose a set of profit maximizing prices where she shares the market 
with firm A only on the very first segment of this interval. So acquiring information on the 
interval (0.5,1] makes no difference on firm A’s ability to attract more customers. 
As a result of lemma 2, each firm sets a uniform price for all customers located on her 
rival’s turf. Let us call these prices PRA and PLB. PRA is the price firm A sets for [0.5,1] and PLB 
is the price firm B sets for [0,0.5). This price is set to maximize firm’s profit in the only 
segment in the opposite turf that firm sells positive quantity in it. This uniform price affects 
the rival’s price in her constrained monopoly segments. Thus the pricing behavior of firm A 
can be explained by these rules:  
− In all segments on [0,0.5] except the very last one, s*, firm A is a constrained 
monopolist. She sets her prices to make the customer on the right hand border of each 
segment indifferent.  
− On s*, the last segment to the right hand side of [0,0.5], firm A competes against the 
uniform price set by firm B for the [0,0.5] interval. 
− On (0.5,1] she only can sell on the very first segment then sets her uniform price for  
(0.5,1] in order to maximize her profit on that very first segment. 
So, firm A’s partition divides [0,0.5] into n segments and she acquires no information on 
(0.5,1]. Equivalently, firm B acquires no information on [0,0.5] and has m segments in her 
partition for (0.5,1].  
We now solve for equilibrium prices. The prices for loyal customers in each side would 
come from: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 + 𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 = 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖),               for 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ;                𝑖𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛 − 1, and 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 + 𝑡𝑡 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 + 𝑡𝑡 (1 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1),               for 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 ≤ 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ;                𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛 + 2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛 + 𝑓𝑓 . 
The prices for two shared market segments are represented by (recall from (A1) and 
(A2)): 
𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴 = 2𝑡𝑡3  (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)               and               𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1,𝐵𝐵 = 2𝑡𝑡3  (2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 1). 
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And the uniform prices for the opposite side could be written as: 
𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 12  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛+1,𝐵𝐵                and               𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐵𝐵 = 12  𝑃𝑃𝑛𝑛𝐴𝐴 . 
Then given the prices for these two segments prices for other segments can easily be 
calculated as:  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧2𝑡𝑡 �23 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 13𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�           𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 ;           𝑖𝑖 = 1,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛 − 12𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)                𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 < 𝑥𝑥 < 12                                      
𝑡𝑡3 (2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 1)                   12 < 𝑥𝑥 < 1                                         
  ;                (15) 
and 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)                   0 < 𝑥𝑥 < 12                                                  2𝑡𝑡3 (2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 1)               12 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1                                           2𝑡𝑡 �13𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 − 23�       𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 < 𝑥𝑥 < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  ;         𝑖𝑖 = 𝑛𝑛 + 2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛 + 𝑓𝑓
  .               (16) 
The associated gross profits are (market shares for border segments are calculated using 
the prices by (5)): 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 2𝑡𝑡�(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1) �23 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 13𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1 + 2𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1). 23 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�+ 𝑡𝑡3 (2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 1). 13 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 12� ,                    and 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1). 13 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� + 2𝑡𝑡3 (2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 1). 23 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 12�+ 2𝑡𝑡 � (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1) �13𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 − 23�𝑛𝑛+𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛+1  . 
After simplifying, the net profits are represented by: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 �2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 �23 − 13𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 2 �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1 + 89 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 + 29 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 12�2� − Γ𝐴𝐴 , and       (17) 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡 �−43 + 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 23𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+12 + 2 � 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)𝑛𝑛+𝑓𝑓
𝑖𝑖=𝑛𝑛+2 + 29 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 + 89 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛+1 − 12�2� − Γ𝐵𝐵 .       (18) 
where Γ𝐴𝐴, Γ𝐵𝐵 are the information costs paid by firm A and firm B in order to acquire 
information. 
If we want to follow the firm’s decision making process we can suppose that the firm 
starts with only one unit of information and splitting [0.1] interval to [0,0.5] and (0.5,1]. This 
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first unit enables the firm to start discriminating on her half. Paying for one more unit of 
information on her own half means that firm is now a constrained monopolist on one part and 
should share the market on the other (i.e. for firm A, the customers on [0,0.25] are her loyal 
customers and she shares the market on (0.25,0.5] with firm B). In the loyal segment the only 
concern for the information acquisition would be the cost of the information. Firms fully 
discriminate the customers depending on the cost of information.  
But there is a trade off in acquiring information and reducing the length of shared 
segment. On one hand, this decision increases the profit of the firm through more loyal 
customers. On the other hand, since her rival charges a uniform price for all customers in the 
firm’s turf, the firm should lower the price for all of her loyal segments. Therefore the second 
effect reduces the firm’s profit. These two opposite forces affect the firm’s decision for 
acquiring a finer partition in the border segment. Proposition 1 shows how each firm decides 
on the volume of the customer-specific information she is going to acquire.  
Proposition 1: Firm A uses these three rules to acquire information:  
1-1. if 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
116, then firm A fully discriminates on [0,0.25]. The equal-size of the segments 
on this interval in the equilibrium partition is determined by the information cost.  
1-2. Firm A acquires no further information on (0.25,0.5]. 
1-3. Firm A acquires no information on (0.5,1]. 
Proof: In order to avoid unnecessary complications, the first part of the proof has been 
discussed in appendix A. It shows that firm A should make a series of decisions regarding to 
split the border segment (see Figure 1). Starting from the point of acquiring no information on 
the left hand side, firm A acquires information in her own turf as long as this expression is 
non-negative: 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡2𝑘𝑘 � 12𝑘𝑘 � 712 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� − 16� − 𝛤𝛤 ,                    (19) 
where 12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘  is the length of the border segment,   
         �12�𝑓𝑓  is the preferred length of loyal segments (where 𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0� 6
         𝛤𝛤 = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘 �𝑓𝑓−𝑘𝑘+12 � is the total information cost. 
We follow this chain of decision makings, starting with n =1 (i.e. no initial loyal segment 
for firm A). The procedure is that firm A starts with k = 1, if equation (19) is non-negative 
then she decides to acquire information on [0, 0.5], splitting this interval to [0, 0.25] and 
(0.25,0.5]. After this he is the constrained monopolist on [0, 0.25] and the preferred length for 
all loyal segments is: 
), and  
                                               
6   ⌊ ⌋  notation represents the floor function (or the greatest integer). 
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�
12�𝑓𝑓 ,               where              𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0�  .                    (20) 
After buying the first unit of information on [0, 0.5] (and consequently the preferred units 
of information on [0, 0.25]) then firm A checks non-negativity of (19) for k = 2 and so forth.  
Table 1 shows the chain of the first two decision statements. As it is clear, the value of the 
decision statement on the second row (and also for every k > 1) is always negative.  
Table 1: Firm A’s chain of decision statements 
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛  k Decision statement 
0 12 1 𝑡𝑡16 �1 − 12𝑓𝑓� − 𝑓𝑓 𝜏𝜏04 ≥ 0          where           𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0� 14 12 2 𝑡𝑡32 �−16 − 12𝑓𝑓� − (𝑓𝑓 − 2) 𝜏𝜏08 ≥ 0          where           𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0� 
The minimum value for r is 2 (the biggest possible length for a loyal segment is 14). It can 
be shown that the value of decision statement (equation (19) for k = 1) is non-negative if and 
only if 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
116. It is clear the second row’s decision statement is always negative. That means 
the length of the shared segment, regardless to the information cost, equals 0.25. Assuming 
𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
116, then the preferred segmentation scenario for firm A is to fully discriminate between 
[0,0.25] (the preferred segment length in this interval is a function of information and 
transportation cost) and acquiring no information for (0.25,0.5]. ♦ QED 
Each firm prefers to just pay for information in her own turf, and the segmentation in the 
constrained monopoly part depends on the transportation and information cost. The only 
segment in each turf that may have a different length is the border segment and firms prefer to 
buy no information on their rival’s turf. 
One of the findings in the proof of proposition 1 is the functional form of firms’ marginal 
profit of information in loyal segment. Equation (A.16) shows that the marginal profit of 
information in a loyal segment (dividing a loyal segment to two) is 
𝑡𝑡4 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)2 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 12𝑘𝑘 � 𝑡𝑡4 × 2𝑘𝑘 − 𝜏𝜏0� 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 are the boundaries of the loyal segment and 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = 12𝑘𝑘 . As it is clear 
the marginal profit of information is decreasing. Decreasing marginal profit guarantees that if 
the firm decides not to split a loyal segment, there is no need to worry about the profitability 
of acquiring a finer partition.  
When the information cost is insignificant (𝜏𝜏0 = 0) the preferred length of a loyal 
segment goes to zero. In other words, firms acquire information for every individual customer 
on [0,0.25] and charge a different price for each individual based on her location. In this case, 
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in equation (19) 𝑘𝑘 → ∞, starting with 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = 0 and 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 0.5 and based on the proposition 1 
the chain of decisions for 𝜏𝜏 = 0 is:  
i) On [0,0.5], 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = 0 then equation (19) turns into  𝑡𝑡16 > 0 and the result is to acquire 
the first unit of information, and consequently acquire full information on [0,0.25].   
ii) On (0.25,0.5],  𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = 0.25 then − 𝑡𝑡192 < 0 and the result is to acquire no further 
information on (0.25, 0.5]. That means even when the information cost is insignificant, the 
positive effect of acquiring more information on the interval of (0.25,0.5] is dominated by the 
negative effect of  falling the constrained monopolistic prices on segments on [0,0.25].  
Figure 5 shows an example for an equilibrium strategy for firm A. Firm B’s preferred 
strategy will be a mirror image of this example. 
                       
0 8
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Figure 5: An example of the equilibrium strategy for firm A in the second scenario 
Figure 6 shows the preferred number of segments by firm A in her turf against the ratio of 
information cost to transportation cost. This figure also shows the net profit of the firm in her 
own turf as a multiplication of transportation cost. 
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𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡�  
Figure 6: The preferred number of segments and the profit of each firm  
as a function of the ratio of information cost over transportation cost 
Figure 7 represents each firm’s preferred length for shared and loyal segments as a 
function of the information and transportation costs.  
 
𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡�  
Figure 7: The length of shared and loyal segments  
as a function of the ratio of information cost over transportation cost 
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Figure 7 also shows that if the cost of the first information unit7
In appendix B, we show that proposition 1 is also true for two other information cost 
functional forms. However, the upper limit on 𝜏𝜏0 and the preferred length of loyal segments 
are different for each case.  
 is less than 𝑡𝑡16 , then firm 
A would be better off by discriminatory pricing in her own turf.  
Scenario Three: Only firm A acquires information 
This scenario is symmetric with scenario 4 (only firm B acquires information).  
Proposition 2: When firm B acquires no information, firm A uses these two rules to 
acquire information:  
2-1. In her own turf: prefers to fully discriminate (subject to information cost). 
2-2. In her rival’s turf
In this case firm B is not able of any discrimination and charges a uniform price for all 
customers. If 116 ≤ 𝜏𝜏0𝑡𝑡 ≤ 18 , then firm A would prefer to acquire just one unit of information in 
the left hand side [0,0.5] and the unique equilibrium prices are:  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) =
⎩
⎪
⎨
⎪
⎧
𝑡𝑡                    𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,0.25]3𝑡𝑡4                 𝑥𝑥 ∈ (0.25,  0.5]  
𝑡𝑡4                     𝑥𝑥 ∈ (0.5,  1]  
                      and              𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑡𝑡2 . 
: acquires no information. 
Proof: See appendix A. 
If 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
116, then the proof of proposition 2 shows that firm B has no share from the left 
hand side (even in the one next to 0.5 point) and only chooses her unique price to maximize 
her profit on (0.5,1] interval. On the other hand, firm A would prefer to fully discriminate the 
left hand side [0,0.5] and the preferred length of the segments are determined by equation 
(20):  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = ��76 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖� 𝑡𝑡             𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 = (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1,  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖] ⊂ [0,0.5] 𝑡𝑡3                                 𝑥𝑥 ∈ (0.5,  1]                                     and            𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) = 2𝑡𝑡3  . 
Figure 8 shows a possible solution for this sub-game. As it is clear the indifferent 
customer on [0,0.5] is the customer who is located exactly on 0.5. Then all the left hand side 
customers buy from firm A. On the right hand side, firm A’s market share is 13 and the rest buy 
from firm B.  
                                               
7   This condition comes from (19) and (20). If the information cost is higher than this upper limit, then firm A 
decides to acquire no information in her own turf at all.  
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Figure 8: An example of the equilibrium strategy for the firms in the third scenario 
Outcome of the Two-Stage Game  
Figure 9 shows the strategic representation of the game when the information cost is 
insignificant (𝜏𝜏0 → 0). As it can be seen the game is a prisoners’ dilemma. 
  Firm B  
  NI I 
Fi
rm
 A
 NI 
𝑡𝑡2 , 𝑡𝑡2 2𝑡𝑡9 , 25𝑡𝑡36  
I 25𝑡𝑡36 , 2𝑡𝑡9  43𝑡𝑡144 , 43𝑡𝑡144 
Figure 9: The outcome of the game when 𝝉𝝉𝟎𝟎 → 𝟎𝟎 
Figure 10 represents firm A’s profit as a function of  𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
. In each pair of strategies the first 
notation refers to firm A’s strategy and the second one to firm B’s. If firm B acquires 
information, firm A’s best response is to do so, irrespective of the information cost. If the 
other firm acquires no information, the best response is to acquire information if the 
information cost is sufficiently low. So if the information cost is sufficiently low, the game 
becomes a prisoners’ dilemma and both firms would have a dominant strategy to acquire 
information. This threshold is 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≈ 0.039. 
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𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡�  
Figure 10: Firm A’s profit for four different scenarios versus  
the information / transportation cost ratio 
Then if 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
> 0.039 , the game has two Nash equilibria: i) both firms acquire information 
and ii) neither of the firms acquire information. If  𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤ 0.039, the game is a prisoners’ 
dilemma where information acquisition is the dominant strategy for both firms. In this case, 
we have excess information acquisition from the firm point of view. Acquiring more 
information will lead to tougher competition and even in the limit, when 𝜏𝜏0 → 0, will lead to 
about 40% decrease in firms’ profits. 
Acquiring information has two opposite effects on the firm’s profit. It enables the firm to 
price discriminate and on the other hand toughens the competition. The latter effect dominates 
the former and when both firms acquire information, they both worsen off. Fixing the 
partitions for both firms, then pricings are strategically complement.  
Given the outcome of this game, one might ask why do the firms not freely give each 
other information about customers on their own turfs? The issue of collusion in sharing the 
information in this game can be looked at from two different points of view. 
Firstly, in the real world situation that our setting might be applied to sharing the 
customer information with a third party is usually illegal. For example, Tescos –the biggest 
supermarket in the UK with almost one third of the market share- has a huge pool of specific 
information about its customers via its club-card scheme. However, it is illegal for Tescos to 
share this information with other supermarkets. 
Secondly, as it is showed in this section, information about the customers in the other side 
of market has no strategic importance for the firm. Then even if the information is available, it 
makes no vital part in pricing decision. Since the outcome of the game shows excessive 
information acquisition, one possibility for collusion is to collude and not acquire 
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information. However, as it was showed, firms have incentive to deviate from this agreement 
and acquire information. 
4 The Simultaneous Move Game 
In this game, firms cannot observe their rival’s information partition. It seems that the 
two-stage game is able to offer a better explanation of the information acquisition decision in 
a competitive market. Firms (especially in retailer market) closely monitor their rival’s 
behavior. Then it seems a reasonable assumption to consider that while competing via prices, 
they are aware of the information partition chosen by their rival. 
We will show that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in this game. Remember that 
every strategy has two parts, the segmentation scenario and the prices for each segment. To 
prove non-existence of pure strategy equilibrium, we show that for different cases (regarding 
the information acquisition decision), at least one of the firms has incentive to deviate from 
any assumed pure strategy equilibrium.  
Case 1: None of the firms acquire information 
The proof for the situation that none of the firms acquire information is trivial. When both 
firms decide to buy no information, the outcome would be charging a uniform price of t for 
both firms. It is clear that a firm has incentive to deviate from this strategy and acquire some 
information when 𝜏𝜏0 is sufficiently small. 
Case 2: Both firms acquire information 
Suppose there is a pure strategy equilibrium where both firms acquire some information. 
Firstly we will show that in this equilibrium, firms acquire no information on their rival’s turf. 
Assume firm B acquires some information on [0,0.5]. In the equilibrium, every firm can 
predict her rival’s partition accurately. Therefore, based on lemma 2, firm B makes no sale on 
every interval except the final right segment on [0,0.5]. Then the information on this interval 
is redundant for firm B. She can profitably deviate, acquire no information on [0,0.5], and 
charge the same price for the entire interval. Then in any pure strategy equilibrium firm B 
acquires no information on firm A’s turf. We will therefore consider all different possibilities 
for firm A to acquire information on [0,0.5]. Then we will show that in any candidate 
equilibrium at least one of the firms has incentive to deviate (the fact that in the equilibrium 
each firm can predict her rival’s strategy is accurately used).  
i) No further information in [0,0.5]: The corresponding equilibrium prices at this interval 
are  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = 2𝑡𝑡3                    and                   ‌𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑡𝑡3 ;                    for ∀𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0,0.5] . 
It is trivial that firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire some information on the left 
hand side. The information cost is not a binding constraint here. It has been shown in the 
proof of proposition 1 that the constraint on whether to acquire some information on [0,0.5) is 
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more relaxed than acquiring any information in the first place (acquiring information on 
[0,1]). 
ii) Partial discrimination on [0,0.25]: This means firm A acquires the information which 
splits [0,0.5] interval to [0,0.25] and (0.25,0.5] and some information (but not fully 
discrimination) on [0,0.25] (and possibly some information on (0.25,0.5]). In the equilibrium, 
firm A knows that firm B sets a uniform price on the left hand side to maximize her payoff 
from the very last segment on the right hand side of (0.25,0.5] interval. Responding to this, as 
shown in proof of proposition 1, firm A has incentive to fully discriminate on [0,0.25]. So a 
strategy profile like this cannot be an equilibrium.  
iii) Full discrimination on [0,0.25] and no further information on (0.25,0.5]: As the 
results of  lemma 2 and proposition 1 show, if the information cost is sufficiently low in 
equilibrium, firm A fully discriminates customers between [0,0.25] (subject to information 
cost) and charges a uniform price for the section (0.25,0.5], and firm B charges a uniform 
price for all customers on the left hand side in order to gain the most possible profit from the 
customers on (0.25,0.5]. Now we want to investigate the players’ incentive to deviate from 
this strategy profile. 
Firm A has incentive to deviate from this strategy and acquire more information in the 
information acquisition stage. Unlike the two-stage game, deviation from this equilibrium and 
acquiring more information in the very last segment of the left hand side (shared segment) 
doesn’t affect firm B’s price for the left hand side. Recalling (A17) from the proof of 
proposition 1, firm A decides to acquire more information in (0.25,0.5] if 12 − 14 ≥ 2�𝜏𝜏𝑡𝑡 or 
𝜏𝜏
𝑡𝑡
≤
164. This is exactly the same upper bound for information cost that satisfies firm A’s 
decision to acquire any information in the left hand side in the first instance. That means if 
information cost is small enough to encourage firm A to acquire some information in [0,0.5] 
interval, then firm A also has incentive to deviate from the proposed strategy profile.  
iv) Full discrimination on [0,0.5]: The corresponding equilibrium prices for the left hand 
side are ((an-1,0.5]  is the very last segment on the right where firm A  acquires information): 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴(𝑥𝑥) = �2𝑡𝑡 �23 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 13𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1�         𝑥𝑥 ∈ (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1,  𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖]     2𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)         𝑥𝑥 ∈ (𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1,  1]                      and         𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵(𝑥𝑥) = 𝑡𝑡3 (1 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1) . 
Firm B has incentive to deviate and acquire some information on the left hand side. If 
firm B buys one unit of information on the left hand side, then she can charge a different price 
(𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵) for [0,0.25]. The extra profit which she can achieve will be: 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = �14 − 12𝑡𝑡 �𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵 − 2𝑡𝑡 � 512 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−13 ���𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵 − 𝜏𝜏 = �16 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−13 − 𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵2𝑡𝑡� 𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵 − 𝜏𝜏 . 
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 The first order condition results 𝑃𝑃�𝐵𝐵 = �16 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−13 � 𝑡𝑡  and the corresponding extra profit of 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡8 (0.5 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1)2 − 𝜏𝜏, which (considering the upper bound on information cost for 
acquiring information in a firm’s own turf) gives firm B incentive to acquire at least one unit 
of information on the left hand side.  
Then the game has no equilibrium when both firms acquire information. 
Case 3: Only firm A acquires information 
Suppose this case has an equilibrium. In the equilibrium each firm can predict her rival’s 
strategy including preferred partition; so firm A knows that in the equilibrium, her rival can 
predict her chosen partition. We try to construct the characteristics of this equilibrium. Since 
in the equilibrium firm B can predict her rival’s partition accurately, then we can use some of 
the results that we had from the first game. 
As seen in lemma 2, firm A knows if she acquires information on the right hand side, firm 
B can prevent her of selling to any customer in the right hand segments, except the very first 
segment. Then firm A has no incentive to acquire information in the right hand side.  
As for the left hand side, proposition 2 shows that firm B knows that firm A can gain the 
most possible profit by fully discriminating. So firm B sets her price to just maximize her 
profit from the only segment in her turf and firm A fully discriminate the left hand segment. 
An equilibrium for this case should have these two characteristics: 
1- In the right hand side, firm A (the only firm who acquires information in this scenario) 
buys no information. Then there is only one segment (0.5,1] and the prices would be   
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 2𝑡𝑡3                    and                   ‌𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 4𝑡𝑡3 . 
2- In the left hand side, firm A fully discriminates subject to information cost given the 
firm B’s uniform price. 
Now we want to investigate firm A’s incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. Given 
firm B’s uniform price, if firm A deviates and acquires just one unit of information in the right 
hand side his marginal profit would be the difference between his equilibrium profit over 
(0.5,1] and the deviation strategy profit over (0.5,0.75] and (0.75,1]. Then the deviation profit 
can be written as (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿  the price charged for the left sub-segment and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅  the price for the right 
sub-segment): 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿 �4𝑡𝑡3 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 � + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 �4𝑡𝑡3 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 − 14� − 𝜏𝜏                    (21) . 
Solving the FOCs, the first part of (21) exactly gives firm A the same profit as the 
supposed equilibrium. If the second part of the profit is greater than the information cost, then 
firm A has incentive for deviation. From the FOC 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅 = 5𝑡𝑡12, the marginal profit of deviation is: 
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∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆 = 5𝑡𝑡12 �1124 − 14� − 𝜏𝜏 = 25𝑡𝑡288 − 𝜏𝜏  . 
If  𝜏𝜏
𝑡𝑡
≤
25288 ≈ 0.087 , firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire at least one unit of 
information in the right hand side. This condition is more relaxed than the condition 
calculated in section 3.2 for acquiring information in her turf at all. That means if the 
information cost is low enough that firm A decides to acquire information in the left hand side 
in the first place, she has incentive to deviate from any equilibrium strategy that constructed 
for this case. 
Outcome of the Simultaneous Move Game 
The major result of studying the simultaneous move game is the non-existence of 
equilibrium in pure strategies. Therefore, the only possible equilibrium of this game would be 
in mixed strategies. Considering that each pure strategy consists of an information partition 
and a pricing function measurable with the chosen information partition, one can imagine that 
in general there are many possible pure strategies. This makes finding the mixed equilibrium 
of the game a difficult task. In appendix C, we investigate the existence of a mixed strategy 
equilibrium through a simple example where the number of possibilities are exogenously 
restricted. 
5 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper has analysed a model of information acquisition by firms, where information 
allows firms to price discriminate. Our benchmark model is one where information 
acquisition decisions are common knowledge at the time that firms compete via prices. We 
show that information acquisition increases price competition and reduces profits, so that we 
have an outcome similar to a prisoners’ dilemma. Our second main finding is that firms 
acquire less information as compared to a monopoly situation, since this softens price 
competition.  
By introducing information cost (and as a consequence segmentation scenario), the third-
degree price discrimination problem can end up neither on fully discrimination policy nor on 
non-discrimination decision. Depending on the cost of every unit of information, every firm 
needs to answer two questions: how should I discriminate (what is the preferred length of 
every segment) and what is the best price to charge for every specified customer? The result 
would be a partial discrimination policy. 
The two-stage game is a prisoners’ dilemma which in equilibrium, firms acquire 
excessive information. Firms also prefer to discriminate partially. Our results show that there 
is a trade-off in acquiring more information. It improves firms’ performances in terms of 
profit by enabling them to price discriminate. On the other hand, acquiring more information 
tends to make the competition between the firms more fierce. Tougher competition drives the 
prices down and ultimately decreases firms’ profits. 
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Our results demonstrate how decreasing marginal profit of information limits firms’ 
willingness to acquire more information. Furthermore, in equilibrium –regardless of the cost 
of information- firms do not have incentive to acquire information on their rival’s turf. 
Acquiring information in a firm’s own turf is also restricted. Extra information in this area 
makes firms profit to fall as result of tougher competition.  
We have also analysed a model where information acquisition decisions are not observed 
by the rival firm. In this game, there is no pure strategy equilibrium. We solve for a mixed 
strategy equilibrium for a simple example, where firms have restricted information acquisition 
possibilities. 
Appendix A 
Proof of lemma 2: Since the firms’ profit on ?̂?𝑠 can be written as a function of the firms’ prices on ?̂?𝑠 
and the segments associated with that (𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖  ; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛), firms solve the maximization problem for ?̂?𝑠 
independently of its compliment. We solve the problem for each possible segmentation situation  
By solving the first order conditions (𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
= 0 , 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵
= 0),  market shares, prices, and profit of 
firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to (9) and (10) and solving them simultaneously, firms’ 
prices are: 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡3 (2𝑎𝑎1 − 4𝑎𝑎0 + 1) , and                    (A1) 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡3 (4𝑎𝑎1 − 2𝑎𝑎0 − 1) .                    (A2) 
By substitution the prices from (A1) and (A2) into (5), the location of marginal customer in every 
segment is derived:  
𝑥𝑥 = 16 (2𝑎𝑎1 + 2𝑎𝑎0 + 1) .                    (A3) 
Case 1: 
In the segments that both firms sell positive quantities, the prices should be non-negative (𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 ≥ 0, 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 ≥ 0) and the marginal customer should be located within the segment (𝑎𝑎0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥 ≤ 𝑎𝑎1)8
And also the length of segment is represented as
. From the 
information acquisition technology at the definition of the model, every two consecutive breaking 
points (the borders of each segment) have the following form: 
𝑎𝑎0 = 2𝑘𝑘 − 12𝑝𝑝  ,𝑎𝑎1 = 2𝑙𝑙 − 12𝑞𝑞                where               𝑘𝑘, 𝑙𝑙,𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞 ∈ ℵ                    (A4) 
9
                                               
8  Obviously, the price restrictions and the location restrictions are equivalent. 
:  
𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑎𝑎0 = 12𝑓𝑓                where               𝑓𝑓 = max{𝑝𝑝, 𝑞𝑞} .                    (A5) 
9  This definition covers all amounts of 𝑎𝑎0 except 𝑎𝑎0 = 0. That can be solved as: 0 < 2𝑎𝑎1 + 1 < 6𝑎𝑎1 then  14 < 𝑎𝑎1. Since 𝑎𝑎1 − 𝑎𝑎0 = 12 > 14  and 𝑎𝑎0 = 0 then 𝑎𝑎1 = 12 is the only possible upper border of a segment with 
positive demand for both firms. 
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Solving the restrictions, the results are: 
i) If  𝑝𝑝 > 𝑞𝑞  then the restrictions hold only for 𝑎𝑎1 = 12; both firms sell positive quantities in the 
segment located exactly on the left hand side of the middle point10
ii) If  𝑝𝑝 < 𝑞𝑞 then the restrictions hold only for 𝑎𝑎0 = 12; both firms sell positive quantities in the 
segment located on the right side of the middle point. 
. 
iii) 𝑝𝑝 = 𝑞𝑞 is impossible, it is equivalent with a segment of length zero.  
In this case, market sharing takes place only for two segments located around 12.  
In case 2 by solving the first order conditions on ?̂?𝑠 (𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵
= 0; 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯𝑛𝑛),  market 
share, prices, and profit of firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to (11) and (12) and solving them 
simultaneously the firms’ prices are: 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡3 �1𝑛𝑛 �2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1 − 𝑎𝑎0� − 3𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 + 1�            for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛;  and                    (A6) 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡3𝑛𝑛 �4𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 2 �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛−1
𝑖𝑖=1 − 2𝑎𝑎0 − 𝑛𝑛�  .                    (A7) 
Case 2: 
The solution is started from the first segment (𝑠𝑠1 which is the first segment in the very left hand 
side of ?̂?𝑠) and shows that the location for indifferent customer does not satisfy 𝑎𝑎0 ≤ 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 𝑎𝑎1 , then the 
maximization problems are reduced to n. This procedure continues to the most right hand side segment 
with a couple of FOCs and problem reduces to the problem solved in case 1. 
𝑥𝑥 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃1𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 = 12 + 16𝑛𝑛 �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 𝑎𝑎0 + �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 + 3𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎0 − 2𝑛𝑛�  .                    (A3) 
Define  𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎0 then: 
𝑥𝑥 = 16 + 23𝑎𝑎0 + 16𝑛𝑛 �𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � . 
To be credible we should have 𝑥𝑥1 ≤ 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝜆𝜆1 and simultaneously 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 > 0 then: 16 + 23𝑎𝑎0 + 16𝑛𝑛 �𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � < 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝜆𝜆1 ,                   (A8) 
and from (A7): 
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎0 − 𝑛𝑛2 > 0                    (A9) 
                                               
10  Proof: 𝑎𝑎1 = 𝑎𝑎0 + 12𝑝𝑝 = 2𝑘𝑘2𝑝𝑝 .  Substitute in (A1) and (A2), and apply in the price restrictions: 𝑘𝑘 > 2𝑝𝑝−2 − 12, and 
𝑘𝑘 < 2𝑝𝑝−2 + 1. Since 𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℵ  then 𝑘𝑘 = 2𝑝𝑝−2, and 𝑎𝑎1 = 12. The proofs of other two cases are quite similar.  
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After simplifying (A8):  12 − 𝑎𝑎0 + 12𝑛𝑛 �𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � − 3𝜆𝜆1 < 0 ,                   (A10) 
And from (A9):  
𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 > 𝑛𝑛 �12 − 𝑎𝑎0� . 
Define 12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0: The RHS of (A10) > 12 − 𝑎𝑎0 + 𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛 �12 − 𝑎𝑎0� − 3𝜆𝜆1 = 32 (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + 𝛾𝛾) − 3𝜆𝜆1 . 
For every 𝑛𝑛 > 1; 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 ≥ 2𝜆𝜆1 then (A8) and (A9) cannot be held simultaneously.  
Then we showed for every 𝑛𝑛 > 1 in the first segment, firm A is a constrained monopolist. For the 
ith step if 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑖𝑖 it is easy to show that these two constraints turn to this form (with 𝑛𝑛 + 2 − 1 FOCs): 
𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 = 12 + 16(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)�𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 + 3(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 − 2(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)� < 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  , 
and     𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 > 0          ⇒           𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗𝑛𝑛
𝑗𝑗=𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 −
𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖2 > 0 . 
After simplifying: 12 − 𝑎𝑎0 + 32 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 − 3𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1 + 12(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)�𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � < 0 ,                   (A11) and     𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 > (𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖) �12 − 𝑎𝑎0�  .               (A12) 
Then  The RHS of (A11) > 32 �12 − 𝑎𝑎0� − 32 (2𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 − 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1)𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1 = 32 (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 − 2𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾) . 
For 𝑖𝑖 < 𝑛𝑛; 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 ≤ 12 (𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖−1) Then (A11) cannot be hold, supposing (A12) holds. 
This procedure continues until the FOCs reduce to 2 conditions and the problem transforms to the 
problem has been solved in case 1. 
In this case by solving the first order conditions for each segment (𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴
= 0, 𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵
= 0; 𝑖𝑖 =1,2,⋯𝑛𝑛) market shares, prices, and profit of firms is calculated. By applying the FOC to (13) and (14) 
and solving them simultaneously the firms’ prices are: 
Case 3: 
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𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡3𝑛𝑛 �𝑛𝑛 + 4𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 2�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 − 4𝑎𝑎0� ;  and                    (A13) 
𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡3 �3𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 1 + 1𝑛𝑛 �2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 −�𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 − 2𝑎𝑎0��            for 𝑖𝑖 = 1,2,⋯ ,𝑛𝑛 .                    (A14) 
Again for the first segment:  
𝑥𝑥1 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃1𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 = 12 + 16𝑛𝑛 �−2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑎𝑎0 + �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 + 3𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎1 − 2𝑛𝑛� . 
Then we should have: 
𝑥𝑥1 = 16 + 𝑎𝑎12 + 16𝑛𝑛 �2𝑎𝑎0 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � < 𝑎𝑎1 . 
Or equivalently:  16 − 𝑎𝑎12 + 16𝑛𝑛 �2𝑎𝑎0 − 2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � < 0 . 
Again consider 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎0 then: 12 − 32𝑎𝑎0 − 32 𝜆𝜆1 + 12𝑛𝑛 �−2𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 + 𝑛𝑛𝑎𝑎0� < 0 , 
or: 12 − 𝑎𝑎0 − 32 𝜆𝜆1 + 12𝑛𝑛 �−2𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + �𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1 � < 0 .               (A15) 
Now, we show that the minimum amount of the left hand side is non-negative. It is easy to show 
that the minimum of (−2𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 + ∑ 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1 ) is − 12𝑛𝑛−1 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  and the maximum amount of 𝜆𝜆1 is 12 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛  then 
(recall 12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0): The RHS of (A15) > 12 − 𝑎𝑎0 − 3𝜆𝜆12 − 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛 = 𝛾𝛾 + 𝜆𝜆𝑛𝑛 �14 − 1𝑛𝑛2𝑛𝑛� . 
Then as long as 𝑛𝑛 > 1 , (A15) is not valid and in the first segment firm A is a constrained 
monopolist. For the ith step, if 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑖𝑖 it is easy to show that firms’ preferred price for each section turn 
to this form: 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡3(𝑛𝑛 − 𝑖𝑖 + 1)�𝑛𝑛 − 𝑖𝑖 + 1 + 4𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 − 2�𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=𝑖𝑖 − 4𝑎𝑎0� ;  and 
𝑃𝑃𝑗𝑗𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡3 �3𝑎𝑎𝑗𝑗 − 1 + 1𝑛𝑛�2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 −�𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=𝑖𝑖 − 2𝑎𝑎0��            for j = 1,2,⋯ , 𝑖𝑖 . 
The location of indifferent customer for the last segment could be calculated as following (with 
𝑛𝑛 + 2 − 𝑖𝑖 FOCs): 
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𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 = 12 + 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 = 12 + 16(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)�−2𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛 + 2𝑎𝑎0 + �𝑎𝑎𝑘𝑘𝑛𝑛
𝑘𝑘=𝑖𝑖 + 3(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 2(𝑛𝑛 + 1 − 𝑖𝑖)� . 
By following a procedure as before it could be shown that 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  as long as 𝑛𝑛 > 𝑖𝑖 and 𝛾𝛾 ≥ 0. It 
means in this case we again end up with a problem similar to case 1 and firms share the market only in 
the very two extreme segments in the middle. ♦ QED 
Proof of proposition 1: Firm A’s decision to acquire one more unit of information to split the 
segment between any two already known consequent points can be considered as one of these two 
cases (note it is already proved that firm A has no incentive to acquire information on the right hand 
side). 
i) Acquisition of one more information unit for dividing one of the first 𝑛𝑛 − 1 segments to two 
equal sub-segments. Since firm A splits one of her loyal segments to two loyal sub-segments, then the 
marginal profit of this segmentation for the firm A is (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘  where 𝑘𝑘 >1): 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 2𝑡𝑡 �−𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−12 � − �𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−12 ��𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1� + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)� − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) . 
Where the first two parts are the amounts of extra profit that firm gets from the two sub-segments 
and the third part represents the similar amount for the original segment that should be subtracted. 
After simplifying: 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡4 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)2 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) .               (𝐴𝐴16) 
This shows that firm A’s demand for more information and consequently more precise price 
discrimination in this part (the first n-1 segments) continues as far as the length of pre-final segments 
satisfies: 
𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 ≥ 2�𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘)𝑡𝑡  . 
or equivalently (by substituting 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘  and 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘): 
𝑘𝑘 ≤ log2 𝑡𝑡4𝜏𝜏0  .               (𝐴𝐴17) 
This result means the firm has incentive to split a loyal segment, if k satisfies this inequality. This 
is equivalent of minimum length which the firm has incentive to split the interval if the loyal interval 
is bigger than this minimum length. Therefore, the preferred length of a loyal segment is �12�𝑘𝑘+1. 
We also can conclude that the preferred length for every firm’s loyal segment in her turf does not 
depend on the location of the segment and depends only on the transportation and information costs 
and considering (A17) and the fact that 𝑘𝑘 ∈ ℵ ∪ {0} then the preferred length for a loyal segment is: 
�
12�𝑓𝑓           𝑤𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒          𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0�  .               (𝐴𝐴18) 
⌊ ⌋ notation represents the floor function (or the greatest integer). It is clear since it is about the length 
of a loyal segment then the minimum acceptable value for r is 3.  
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ii) Acquisition of one more information unit for dividing the nth segment to two equal sub-
segments. Since firm A splits one shared segment to two sub-segments which the left one will be a 
loyal segment and the right one is a shared segment with her rival, then the marginal profit of such 
segmentation for the firm A is (12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘): 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 4𝑡𝑡3 �12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 2𝑡𝑡3 ��12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �2 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 � − 2𝑡𝑡 �12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1��14 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �
+ 8𝑡𝑡9 �12 − 12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �2 − 8𝑡𝑡9 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘)  ,  
or     ∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡3 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 − 𝑡𝑡6 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) =  𝑡𝑡3 × 2𝑘𝑘 � 12𝑘𝑘 − 12� − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) . 
For ∀𝑘𝑘, this marginal profit is negative and shows the firm A’s profit reduces by acquiring one 
more unit of information in this part regardless of information cost. But we should consider that the 
left sub-segment created after this information acquisition all are loyal customers now and the 
possibility of making extra profit by using constrained monopoly power on this sub-segment should be 
considered. This possibility can be investigated. Consider (A18), assume the preferred length of loyal 
segment is �12�𝑓𝑓  where 𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0� ≥ 3. It is clear acquiring information in this interval is only 
profitable if  𝑓𝑓 > 𝑘𝑘; however the following result is true for any value of r. By adding the profit of this 
chain of segmentation the net profit of segmentation in the nth segment, �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1,  12� , is: 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 4𝑡𝑡3 �12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1� − 2𝑡𝑡3 ��12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �2 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �
− 2𝑡𝑡��12�𝑓𝑓 �14 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 � �𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 + 𝑖𝑖2𝑓𝑓 �14 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 ��2
𝑖𝑖=1 + 8𝑡𝑡9 �12 −
12 + 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−12 �2
−
8𝑡𝑡9 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 −  Γ  ,  
or 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 �� 712 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�2 − 16 �12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1�� −  Γ  ; 
and finally  
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡2𝑘𝑘 � 12𝑘𝑘 � 712 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� − 16� −  Γ                 (19) 
Where 12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘 , and 𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0� and the information cost is  
Γ = 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) + � 2𝑖𝑖−(𝑘𝑘+1)𝜏𝜏(𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓−1
𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘+1 = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘 + � 2𝑖𝑖−(𝑘𝑘+1) 𝜏𝜏02𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘+1 = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘 . 𝑓𝑓 − 𝑘𝑘 + 12   . 
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If the net profit calculated by (19) is negative then the segmentation in the nth segment is not 
profitable for firm A. Then the segmentation in the shared segment in firm A’s turf is preferred by her 
as far as (19) is non-negative which because of it is importance is discussed in the main body of paper. 
♦ QED 
Proof of proposition 2: 
We know that the firms only share the customers on the two border segments. Suppose Firm A 
acquires information in her own side such that the last left hand segment is (𝑎𝑎 ,  0.5], and as it has been 
proved in proposition 1 she has no incentive to pay for information in the right hand side. Then the 
maximization problems that should be solved simultaneously are: 
 Firm 𝐴𝐴′s profit for (𝑎𝑎 ,  0.5]:                    𝜋𝜋𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵−𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 − 𝑎𝑎�. Firm 𝐴𝐴′s profit for (0.5 ,  1]:                    𝜋𝜋𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 �𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 �. Firm 𝐵𝐵′s profit for (𝑎𝑎 ,  1]:                    𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 �12 − 2𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 − 𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 − 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴2𝑡𝑡 �. 
Solving the FOCs and the results are: 
𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵 = �12 − 𝑎𝑎3� 𝑡𝑡 ,              𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐴𝐴 = �34 − 7𝑎𝑎6 � 𝑡𝑡 , and               𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝐴𝐴 = �14 − 𝑎𝑎6� 𝑡𝑡 . 
And the locations of indifferent customers in these two segments are: 
𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 = 38 + 5𝑎𝑎12                and               𝑥𝑥𝑅𝑅 = 58 − 𝑎𝑎12 .  
These values should satisfy 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖 > 0, 𝑎𝑎 < 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 < 0.5, and 0.5< 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 < 1. 
Since if 𝑎𝑎 > 0.3, then 𝑥𝑥𝐿𝐿 will not satisfy its condition. Therefore, for 𝑎𝑎 > 0.3, firm B cannot gain 
from the left hand side. That means if firm A decides to split up (0.25,0.5] then firm B just set her price 
to gain the most possible profit from the right hand side. 
Then we compare the profit of firm A for different possible decisions (the profits are easily 
calculated similar to the result of lemma 2)11
1- No information in the left hand side:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 5𝑡𝑡16 − 𝜏𝜏0, :  
2- Fully discriminate [0,0.25]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �241576 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑓𝑓+32 𝜏𝜏0, and 
3- Fully discriminate [0,0.5]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �2536 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� 𝑡𝑡 − 2𝑓𝑓+32 𝜏𝜏0  ; 
where 𝑓𝑓 = �log2 𝑡𝑡2𝜏𝜏0�. 
If  𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
5396𝑓𝑓  then the third one provides the largest profit for firm A (the profit on the first case 
exceeds the third one only when 𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≥
101576  which is larger than 116 the upper bound of information 
acquisition decision calculated in proposition 1); then she prefers to fully discriminate all the left hand 
side. In this case firm B’s profit equals to 2𝑡𝑡9 . ♦ QED 
                                               
11  The length of the loyal segments is calculated with the same rule as equation (20). 
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Appendix B 
In this appendix we replace our assumed form of information cost function with two alternative 
functional forms. Then we represent the changes to the outcomes of the model as a result of these 
changes. Note that lemma 1 and lemma 2 are true regardless of the information cost sequence. We 
focus on how the changes to equation (2) changes proposition 1, proposition 2, and the outcome of 
two-stage game. The result is that firms strategically behave in the same way. Only the length of the 
loyal segments and the thresholds on information cost calculated in the proofs are different. 
Our two alternative information cost functions are:  
i)  constant information cost:  𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = ?̅?𝜏 for ∀k.  
ii) information cost with general functional form of:  
𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝜏𝜏0,  for  ∀k.  (B1) 
The other two information cost functions (equation (2) and the constant information cost) are 
specific cases of (B1).12
𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = ?̅?𝜏   for   ∀k. 
Proposition 1: 
The proposition 1 is true for this case. Only because of the change in information cost function to 
a linear cost function the limit on the first rule is different:  
Recall equation (A16) the marginal profit of acquiring a unit of information in a loyal segment:  
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡4 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)2 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘).              (𝐴𝐴16) 
 
In order to emphasis the changes, we add notations c and g to each equation number that changes 
for constant and general information cost functions respectively. 
 
Constant information cost:  
Assume equation (2) is replaced by:  
This equation gives us the limit to the which is now (by substituting 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘  
and  𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = ?̅?𝜏) equation (A17) changes to: 
�
12�𝑘𝑘                where               k ≤ 12 log2 𝑡𝑡4?̅?𝜏  .               (A17. c) 
Then the preferred length for a loyal segment is: 
�
12�𝑓𝑓                where               𝑓𝑓 = �12 log2 𝑡𝑡?̅?𝜏�  .               (20. c) 
                                               
12   We decided to have the special case of 𝛼𝛼 = 0.5 in the main body of paper, since calculating the closed form 
of some equations which helps to demonstrate our results is more complicated for the general functional form 
of (3). 
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The marginal profit of a unit of information on the shared border segment with the length of  �12�𝑘𝑘  
is (note the marginal profit has the same format and only the information cost and the preferred length 
of the loyal segment are different): 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡2𝑘𝑘 � 12𝑘𝑘 � 712 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� − 16� − 2𝑓𝑓−𝑘𝑘  ?̅?𝜏                (19. c) 
where  12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘 , and 𝑓𝑓 = �12 log2 𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏��. 
Then the chain of decision statements in table 1 changes to table 2. 
Table 2: Firm A’s chain of decision statements with a constant information cost 
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛  k Decision statement 
0 12 1 𝑡𝑡16 �1 − 12𝑓𝑓� − 2𝑓𝑓 ?̅?𝜏  ≥ 0          where           𝑓𝑓 = �12 log2 𝑡𝑡?̅?𝜏� 14 12 2 𝑡𝑡32 �−16 − 12𝑓𝑓� − 2𝑓𝑓 ?̅?𝜏 ≥ 0          where           𝑓𝑓 = �12 log2 𝑡𝑡?̅?𝜏� 
As it can be seen the information acquisition rules set out in proposition 1 is still true and only the 
upper limit on the information cost changes to  𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡
≤
164.  
Proposition 2: 
The first part of the proof to proposition 2 is the same. We have to continue the proof form the 
point where the profits should be compared. We compare the profit of firm A for different possible 
decisions: 
1- No information in left hand side:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 5𝑡𝑡16 − ?̅?𝜏 
2- Fully discriminate [0,0.25]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �241576 − 12𝑘𝑘+4� 𝑡𝑡 − �2𝑘𝑘 + 1�?̅?𝜏 
3- Fully discriminate [0,0.5]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �2536 − 12𝑘𝑘+3� 𝑡𝑡 − �2𝑘𝑘+1 + 1�?̅?𝜏   
where 𝑘𝑘 = max � 𝑧𝑧, 0|𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝒵𝒵, 12 log2 𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏� − 3 < 𝑧𝑧 ≤ 12 log2 𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏� − 2� 
Obviously the third one provides the largest profit for firm A (the profit on first case exceeds the 
third one only when 𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡
≥ 0.14 that it is larger than the upper bound of information acquisition decision 
calculated on 3.2); then she prefers to fully discriminate all the left hand side. In this case firm B’s 
profit would be equal to 2𝑡𝑡9 .  
If the constant information cost is considered to be equal to the cost of first unit of information in 
the equation (2) (?̅?𝜏 = 𝜏𝜏0) then switching to a constant information cost increases the information cost 
and as a result the limit on the information would be tighter to get the same equilibrium outcome. 
Outcome of the game: 
Again similar to the benchmark functional from in the paper; If firm B acquires information, firm 
A’s best response is to do so, irrespective of the information cost. If the other firm acquires no 
information, the best response is to acquire information if the information cost is sufficiently low. So if 
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the information cost is sufficiently low, the game becomes a prisoners’ dilemma and both firms would 
prefer to acquire information. This threshold is  𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡
= 0.024.  
Then if 𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡
> 0.024 the game has two Nash equilibria; i) both firms acquire information and ii) 
neither of the firms acquire information. If  𝜏𝜏�
𝑡𝑡
≤ 0.024, the game becomes a prisoners’ dilemma where 
information acquisition is the dominant strategy for both firms. It is clear form the profits that in this 
case we have excess information acquisition from the firm point of view. 
General information cost function:  
Assume equation (2) is replaced by:  
𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝜏𝜏0   for   ∀k.     (3) 
The only restriction that we need to impose on 𝛼𝛼 is 𝛼𝛼 > 14 which we will discuss this shortly. Note 
that if 𝛼𝛼 > 12 then this case is equivalent to (2); and if 𝛼𝛼 = 1, then this functional form is equivalent to 
constant information cost.  
Proposition 1: 
The proposition 1 is true and only because of the change in information cost function to a general 
cost function the limit on the first rule is different. Recall equation (A16) the marginal profit of 
acquiring a unit of information in a loyal segment:  
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡4 (𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1)2 − 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘).              (𝐴𝐴16) 
Before we go any further, we impose the restriction on this marginal profit to make it a decreasing 
function on k. It is necessary, because it guarantees that when the firm discovered that the marginal 
profit of splitting a loyal segment gets to zero, there is no need to investigate the profitability of any 
finer partition. It can be shown that the sufficient condition for decreasing marginal cost is 𝛼𝛼 > 14. 
This equation gives us the limit to the which is now (by substituting 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘  and 
𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) = 𝛼𝛼𝑘𝑘𝜏𝜏0) equation (A17) changes to 
�
12�𝑘𝑘                where               k ≤ log4𝛼𝛼 𝑡𝑡4𝜏𝜏0  .               (A17. g) 
Then the preferred length for a loyal segment is 
�
12�𝑓𝑓                where               𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0 �  .               (20. g) 
The marginal profit of a unit of information on the shared border segment with the length of  �12�𝑘𝑘  
is (note the marginal profit has the same format and only the information cost and the preferred length 
of the loyal segment are different) 
∆𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡2𝑘𝑘 � 12𝑘𝑘 � 712 − 12𝑓𝑓+2� − 16� − Γ .               (19. g) 
Where  12 − 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖−1 = �12�𝑘𝑘 , 𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0�, and the information cost is  
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Γ = 𝜏𝜏(𝑘𝑘) + � 2𝑖𝑖−(𝑘𝑘+1)𝜏𝜏(𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓−1
𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘+1 = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘 + � 2𝑖𝑖−(𝑘𝑘+1)𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝜏𝜏0𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘+1 = 𝜏𝜏02𝑘𝑘 �1 + � 2𝑖𝑖−1𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=𝑘𝑘+1 �  . 
Then the chain of decision statements in table 1 changes as it is demonstrated in table 3. 
Table 3: Firm A’s chain of decision statements with a general information cost function 
𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛−1 𝑎𝑎𝑛𝑛  k Decision statement 
0 
12 1 𝑡𝑡16 �1 − 12𝑓𝑓� − 𝜏𝜏0 �1 + � 2𝑖𝑖−1𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1
𝑖𝑖=1 � ≥ 0         where         𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0 � 14 12 2 𝑡𝑡32 �−16 − 12𝑓𝑓� − 𝜏𝜏04 �1 + � 2𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1
𝑖𝑖=2 � ≥ 0         where          𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0 � 
As it can be seen the information acquisition rules set out in proposition 1 is still true and only the 
upper limit on the information cost depends on the value of 𝛼𝛼.  
Proposition 2: 
The first part of the proof to proposition 2 is the same. We have to continue the proof form the 
point where the profits should be compared. We compare the profit of firm A for different possible 
decisions: 
1- No information in left hand side:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 5𝑡𝑡16 − 𝜏𝜏0 
2- Fully discriminate [0,0.25]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �241576 − 12𝑓𝑓+4� 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏0 �32 + ∑ 2𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=2 �  
3- Fully discriminate [0,0.5]:  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = �2536 − 12𝑓𝑓+3� 𝑡𝑡 − 𝜏𝜏0 �32 + ∑ 2𝑖𝑖−1𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=2 �   
where 𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0� 
In order to have a result similar to proposition 2 the following inequality must hold: 
𝜏𝜏0
𝑡𝑡
≤
27 − 12𝑓𝑓+4
∑ 2𝑖𝑖−2𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓−1𝑖𝑖=2               where               𝑓𝑓 = �log4𝛼𝛼 𝛼𝛼𝑡𝑡𝜏𝜏0� 
It showed that this inequality holds as long as information cost is small enough that firm acquires 
some information in the first place.  
Appendix C 
Example: Suppose that only one unit of information is available for the firms which costs τ. This 
means the only possible strategies for firms are: 
σ1: No information acquisition and charging a uniform price of 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖1 , 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵 
σ2: Acquiring one unit of information and charging 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝐿𝐿  for [0,0.5] and 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖2𝑅𝑅  for (0.5,1] , 𝑖𝑖 = 𝐴𝐴,𝐵𝐵  
We showed that there is no pure strategy equilibrium in general when there was no exogenous 
limit on the number of information units a firm can acquire. But since in this example we restrict 
available information units to one, we need to investigate this matter again. Three different cases 
should be considered. 
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Case 1: Both firms choose σ1: In this case (no information acquisition) by solving the first order 
condition the equilibrium candidate is 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 = 𝑡𝑡  and the profits are 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 𝑡𝑡 2� . Firm A has 
incentive to deviate and acquire information if 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 �12 + 𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 � + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 �𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 � − 𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡2  .               (C1)
 
The deviation strategy for firm A would be to choose σ2 and charge 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡 2�  which 
gives her the deviation profit of 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 = 5𝑡𝑡 8� − 𝜏𝜏. Therefore firm A has incentive to deviate in this case 
if 
𝜏𝜏 ≤
𝑡𝑡8  .               (C2)
 
Case 2: One firm (say A) chooses σ1 and the other chooses σ2: In this case, by solving the first 
order condition the equilibrium candidate is 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑡𝑡 2�   and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑡𝑡 4�  , 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅 = 3𝑡𝑡 4�  and the profits are 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝑡𝑡 4�   and 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 5𝑡𝑡 16� − 𝜏𝜏. We will investigate both firms incentive to deviate in this case. 
Firm A has incentive to deviate and acquire information if 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 �12 + 𝑡𝑡 4� − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 �+ 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 �3𝑡𝑡 4� − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 � − 𝜏𝜏 ≥ 𝑡𝑡4  .               (C3)
 
The deviation strategy for firm A would be choosing σ2 and, by solving (C3) for the fist order 
condition, the deviation prices are 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 5𝑡𝑡 8�   and 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 3𝑡𝑡 8�  (the boundary conditions will be held 
for these values) that gives her the deviation profit of  𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 = 17𝑡𝑡 64� − 𝜏𝜏. Therefore firm A has 
incentive to deviate in this case if: 
𝜏𝜏 ≤
𝑡𝑡64  .               (C4)
 
Firm B’s incentive to deviate and choosing σ1 depends on whether the following inequality holds 
or not: 
𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 �12 − 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 − 𝑡𝑡 2�2𝑡𝑡 � ≥ 5𝑡𝑡16 − 𝜏𝜏  .               (C5)
 
By solving (A23) for the first order condition, the deviation price is 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 = 3𝑡𝑡 4�  which gives her 
the deviation profit of 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷 = 9𝑡𝑡 32� . Therefore firm B has incentive to deviate in this case if: 
𝜏𝜏 ≥
𝑡𝑡32  .               (C6)
 
So if 𝑡𝑡 64� ≤ 𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 32�  this case has a pure strategy equilibrium and for every other value of 𝜏𝜏 at 
least one of the firms has incentive to deviate. It worth mentioning that in general when there is no 
external limits on information acquisition (despite this example that only one unit of information is 
available) these two boundaries move towards each other and there will be no pure strategy 
equilibrium. 
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Case 3: Both firms choose σ2: in this case by solving the first order conditions the equilibrium 
candidate is 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 2𝑡𝑡 3�  , 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 𝑡𝑡 3�   and 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑡𝑡 3�  , 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅 = 2𝑡𝑡 3�  and the profits are                        
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴 = 𝜋𝜋𝐵𝐵 = 5𝑡𝑡 18� − 𝜏𝜏. Firm A has incentive to deviate, acquire no information and charge a uniform 
price if 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 �12 + 𝑡𝑡 3� − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴12𝑡𝑡 + 2𝑡𝑡 3� − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴12𝑡𝑡 � ≥ 5𝑡𝑡18 − 𝜏𝜏  .               (C7)
 
By solving the first order condition for (C7), the deviation price would be calculated as 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑡𝑡 2�  
(the boundary conditions will be satisfied for this value) that gives her the deviation profit of        
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴
𝐷𝐷 = 𝑡𝑡 4� ; therefore firm A (or firm B) has incentive to deviate in this case if: 
𝜏𝜏 ≥
𝑡𝑡36  .               (C8)
 
Summarizing our finding ((C2), (C3), (C4), and (C8)) from these three cases, we can claim that 
for this example: 
i) If  𝜏𝜏 > 𝑡𝑡 8�  then there is a pure strategy equilibrium of acquiring no information. In other words 
in this case information is too expensive to acquire. The similar condition has been shown for 
the two-stage game in general. 
ii) If 𝑡𝑡 36� ≤ 𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 8�  then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. 
iii) If 𝜏𝜏 < 𝑡𝑡 36�  then there is a pure strategy equilibrium of acquiring the only unit of information 
available.  
If 𝑡𝑡 36� ≤ 𝜏𝜏 ≤ 𝑡𝑡 8�  then there is no pure strategy equilibrium. The lower limit on this condition is a 
result of having an exogenous limit on the number of information unit available. As it has been shown 
earlier having this limit removed in general case this lower limit will vanish. 
Mixed Strategy Equilibrium: If firm B randomizes between two strategies with probability 𝛽𝛽1 
and 𝛽𝛽2 respectively then 
𝛽𝛽1 + 𝛽𝛽2 = 1 .               (C9) 
So firm A’s profit related to strategies σ1 and σ2 respectively are: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴1 = 𝛽𝛽1𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴12𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴12𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴12𝑡𝑡 �  , and
 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴2 = 𝛽𝛽1 �𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 � + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 ��+ 𝛽𝛽2 �𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 � + 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 �� − 𝜏𝜏  .
 
So the FOCs are: 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴1
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝛽𝛽1 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵12𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽2 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 − 2𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1𝑡𝑡 � = 0  ,               (C10) 
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𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴2
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 𝛽𝛽1 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵12𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽2 �12 + 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿2𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿𝑡𝑡 � = 0 , and               (C11) 
𝜕𝜕𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴2
𝜕𝜕𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 𝛽𝛽1 �𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵12𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 � + 𝛽𝛽2 �𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅2𝑡𝑡 − 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅𝑡𝑡 � = 0  .               (C12) 
If we concentrate on the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium then we have13
By solving these four equations, the mixed strategy of  (𝛽𝛽1,  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1,  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 ,𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 ) can be calculated.
: 
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 ,               𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅   , and               𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿  . 
Considering these, after some simplifications and solving (C10) to (C12) simultaneously we will 
get:  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵1 = 2𝑡𝑡4 − 𝛽𝛽1 − 𝛽𝛽12  ,         𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝐿𝐿 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝑅𝑅 = 4 − 2𝛽𝛽13 − 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1  , and        𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴2𝑅𝑅 = 𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵2𝐿𝐿 = 4 − 2𝛽𝛽13 − 𝛽𝛽1 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴1 −  𝑡𝑡3 − 𝛽𝛽1. 
Also the mixed strategy equilibrium should make firm A indifferent between two strategies, this 
means: 
𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴1 = 𝜋𝜋𝐴𝐴2  .                (C13)
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Figure 15 shows the value of 𝛽𝛽1 for different ratios of information cost over transportation cost. 
The figure shows that when the information cost is higher, it is significantly more likely for the firms 
to acquire the information in the mixed strategy equilibrium.  
 
 
𝜏𝜏
𝑡𝑡�  
Figure 15: The probability of choosing the non-information acquisition strategy  
in the mixed strategy equilibrium 
Figure 16 plots the trend of prices and profit as a multiplication of t. As it can be seen, the prices 
are stable for a wide range of information costs; it could be because in this simple example only one 
                                               
13  If we want to investigate the existence of asymmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, different probabilities for 
choosing S1 and S2 should be considered for firm A and for this simple example we will end up with 10 
equations and 10 unknowns. 
14  To solve for these four equations to find the four unknowns, we use numerical methods and these results are 
the unique possible outcomes. 
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unit of information is available. By increasing the information cost all prices tend to increase, this 
means the lower the information cost, the more intense the competition. 
  
𝜏𝜏
𝑡𝑡�  
Figure 16: The prices and profit in the mixed strategy equilibrium 
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